Loosechangeguide - Section 6

Avant propos
Ce document est un miroir du site www.loosechangeguide.com malheureusement disparu, le nom de domaine n'ayant pas été renouvelé. Elle a été restaurée à partir de web.archive.org.

www.loosechangeguide.com est une mine d'informations permettant de décrypter la thèse conspirationniste des attentats du 11 septembre 2001. Il répond point par point aux arguments exposés par Loose Change 2. La reproduction de ce site a pour objectif d'en assurer la pérennité.

Les textes surlignés en jaune, et parfois précédées du repère temporel HH:MM:SS, sont la transcription de l'audio de Loose Change 2, à laquelle contre-argumente l'auteur de www.loosechangeguide.com.

Les textes surlignés en bleu sont des extraits de documents cités par l'auteur.

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9-11 Loose Change Second Edition Viewer Guide

And debunking of various 9/11 conspiracy theories

Sections of this document :

• Section I : Introduction, The First Events
  
• Section II : AA Flight 77 and the Pentagon
  
• Section III : The World Trade Center
  
• Section IV : United Flight 93
  
• Section V : Flight Recorders, Cell Phone Calls, Miscellany
  
• Section VI : Appendices (this page)
  

The following section includes :

• Appendix A : Internet Resources
  
• Appendix B : Summary of LC2E errors
  
• Appendix C : 9/11 Air Defense Response
  
• Appendix D : Excerpts from the PNAC "Pearl Harbor" report
  
• Appendix E : Changes from LC first edition

Appendix A : Some Internet Resources for Further Research

I became aware of 9/11 conspiracy issues and of "Loose Change" by reading a forum for critical thinkers and debunkers of the ridiculous on the James Randi Educational Foundation website. There is a lively, informative discussion of 9/11 conspiracy issues there, and unlike the "Loose Change" forum, you won't be banned for disagreeing. Just be sure you've done your homework, because the JREFers have done theirs.

A Field Guide to Critical Thinking

Government Reports :

9-11 Commission Report

NIST Report WTC

FEMA WTC Report Chapter 1

FEMA WTC 1 & 2

FEMA WTC 4,5,6

FEMA WTC 7 Report

NIST Report Fire & WTC Structural Steel

NIST WTC Public Briefing

NIST WTC Materials Testing Videos and Computer Simulations

General 9/11 Conspiracy Debunking Sites :

9-11 Myths...Reading Between the Lies

Popular Mechanics: Debunking the Myths

9-11 Conspiracy Smasher

Refuting 9-11 Conspiracy Theories

9-11 Conspiracy Fact & Fiction

Controlled Demolition? Think Again.

Wikipedia's 9/11 links

General 9-11 Engineering Issues (not too technical) :

PBS Nova Online: Why the towers fell

BBC Horizon WTC Program with Transcript

WTC Collapse: JOM Article

How Building Implosions Work

Collection of MIT Articles About 9-11

A Few Eyewitness and Victim Stories, Remains & Debris Identification :

Flight 77 Eyewitness Accounts

Flight 93: 40 Lives, One Destiny

Flight 93 Personal Effects Returned

DNA & 9-11

Flight 77 & Pentagon DNA Analysis

WTC & Pentagon Aircraft Debris Photos

FEMA NYC attack photos

Articles That Are More Technical :

Forensics - Physical Constants of Materials

MIT WTC Materials & Structures Analysis

JOM analysis of WTC Steel

9-11 The Technical Side (CAD Digest)

9-11 WTC (CAD Digest)

Frank Greening's WTC Collapse Report

Addendum to Greening's WTC Report: Energy Transfer

Frank Greening's questons about NIST Report

Terrorism & 9/11 :

Terror Warnings Timeline (CT Slant)

FBI Statement on Hijackers' Activities

Killtown's Hijacking, Aircraft, & Phone Calls page (CT slant)


Appendix B : Summary of "Loose Change Second Edition" Errors of Commission

Errors of fact: 81

Post hoc ergo prompter hoc fallacies: 92

Assumptions and conjectures not supported by evidence: 92

Photo & video images that do not support statements being made: 48

Non sequiturs: 24

Opinions expressed on technical subjects by non-experts: 22

Anonymous sources: 19

"Straw man" arguments: 10

Overgeneralizations: 10

Arguments to authority: 3

Similes or metaphors taken as literal statements: 12

Statements misleading because incomplete quotes used: 25

Total flubs: 426


Appendix C : 9/11 Air Defense Response

On September 11, 2001 the normal contingent of 14 fighters was on alert to protect the United States. Four of those were responsible for the northeast: two at Otis ANGB on Cape Cod and two at Langley AFB in southern Virginia. Before 9/11 NORAD was responsible for intruders heading to the U.S and Canada from outside our borders, not from within. Air Force planes were available for internal intecepts but did not take a proactive role: the FAA would have to request them to scramble if needed. NORAD and the FAA did run hijacking exercises that involved planes coming from outside the U.S., but as far as I know they did not plan for simultaneous multiple-plane hijackings , or for hijackings starting within the U.S.

From the 9/11 Commission report :

Before 9/11, it was not unheard of for a commercial aircraft to deviate slightly from its course, or for an FAA controller to lose radio contact with a pilot for a short period of time. A controller could also briefly lose a commercial aircraft's transponder signal, although this happened much less frequently. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a rare and alarming occurrence, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an aircraft crash. In all of these instances, the job of the controller was to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other planes in the vicinity in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course. Alarm bells would not start ringing until these efforts-which could take five minutes or more-were tried and had failed.

Would the hijacked planes be easy to find? No. The hijackers turned off the planes' identifying transponders, so that Air Traffic Control would have to sort them out from a few thousand radar blips on screen in the northeast. And NORAD's radar system mostly looked outward from the coast, not inward.

On 9/11 the U.S. air defense system was not "engaged in as many as 15 war games simulating hijacks and attacks." There is specifically no record of hijacking drills being performed. The only military radar "clutter" was on NORAD screens in Colorado, and was eliminated as soon as the real-world alert was issued. Source

Here is NORAD's timeline of events:

American Airlines Flight 11 Boston enroute to Los Angeles
FAA Notification to NEADS 0840*
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis Air National Guard Base, Falmouth, Mass. Two F-15s) 0846**
Fighters Airborne 0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 1) 0846 (estimated)***
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location Aircraft not airborne/153 miles

United Airlines Flight 175 Boston enroute to Los Angeles
FAA Notification to NEADS 0843
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis ANGB, Falmouth, Mass.
Same 2 F-15s as Flight 11) 0846
Fighters Airborne 0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 2) 0902 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 8 min****/71 miles

American Flight 77 Dulles enroute to Los Angeles
FAA Notification to NEADS 0924
Fighter Scramble Order (Langley AFB, Hampton, Va. 2 F-16s) 0924
Fighters Airborne 0930
Airline Impact Time (Pentagon) 0937(estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 12 min/105 miles

United Flight 93 Newark to San Francisco
FAA Notification to NEADS N/A *****
Fighter Scramble Order (Langley F-16s already airborne for AA Flt 77)
Fighters Airborne (Langley F-16 CAP remains in place to protect DC)
Airline Impact Time (Pennsylvania) 1003 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 11 min/100 miles
(from DC F-16 CAP)

As for the FAA's culpability, the 9/11 Commission report does say the FAA did not follow proper procedure for notifying the military :

Military Notification and Response :
Boston Center (FAA) did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked.

And :

In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes before it struck the North Tower. That nine minutes' notice before impact was the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings.

Langley fighters placed on battle stations :
Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first to military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were concerned about refueling. NEADS considered scrambling alert fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia to New York, to provide backup. The Langley fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09.¹³⁷ NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked.

Confusion between flight 77 and flight 11, fighters head in wrong direction :

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he's heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.¹⁴⁹

After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the order at 9:23:"Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area... . [I]f they're there then we'll run on them.. . .These guys are smart." That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the nation's capital.¹⁵⁰

At the suggestion of the Boston Center's military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: "We're looking-we also lost American 77."The time was 9:34.¹⁵¹This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.

At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington: "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters: "Okay, we're going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House." He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean. "I don't care how many windows you break," he said. "Damn it.. . . Okay. Push them back."¹⁵²

The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target's location. Second, a "generic" flight plan-prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly-incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go "090 for 60" superseded the original scramble order.¹⁵³

After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but "it kind of faded" over Washington. The time was 9:38.The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46.The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away.¹⁵⁴

Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.

So, confusion? Absolutely. Major problems that needed fixing? You bet. Evidence of conspiracy? None.


Appendix D : Excerpts from the PNAC "Pearl Harbor" report

Excerpts from :

REBUILDING AMERICA'S DEFENSES
Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century
A Report of The Project for the New American Century
September 2000

ABOUT THE PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

Established in the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American Century is a nonprofit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership. The Project is an initiative of the New Citizenship Project. William Kristol is chairman of the Project, and Robert Kagan, Devon Gaffney Cross, Bruce P. Jackson and John R. Bolton serve as directors. Gary Schmitt is executive director of the Project.

As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's most preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievement of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape anew century favorable to American principles and interests?"[What we require is] a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities." Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership of the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20thcentury should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of the past century should have taught gusto embrace the cause of American leadership."

- From the Project's founding Statement of Principles



PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY____

1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 510, Washington, D.C. 20036

Telephone: (202) 293-4983 / Fax: (202) 293-4572

Preserving the desirable strategic situation in which the United States now finds itself requires a globally preeminent military capability both today and in the future. But years of cuts in defense spending have eroded the American military's combat readiness, and put in jeopardy the Pentagon's plans for maintaining military superiority in the years ahead. Increasingly, the U.S. military has found itself undermanned, inadequately equipped and trained, straining to handle contingency operations, and ill-prepared to adapt itself to the revolution in military affairs. Without a well-conceived defense policy and an appropriate increase in defense spending, the United States has been letting its ability to take full advantage of the remarkable strategic opportunity at hand slipway.

With this in mind, we began a project in the spring of 1998 to examine the country's defense plans and resource requirements. We started from the premise that U.S. military capabilities should be sufficient to support an American grand strategy committed to building upon this unprecedented opportunity. We did not accept pre-ordained constraints that followed from assumptions about what the country might or might not be willing to expend on its defenses.

[Goals]

ESTABLISH FOUR CORE MISSIONS for U.S. military forces :

Defend the American homeland;

fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars;

perform the "constabulary" duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions;

transform U.S. forces to exploit the "revolution in military affairs;" To carry out these core missions, we need to provide sufficient force and budgetary allocations. In particular, the United States must:

MAINTAIN NUCLEAR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, basing the U.S. nuclear deterrent upon a global, nuclear net assessment that weighs the full range of current and emerging threats, not merely the U.S.-Russia balance.

RESTORE THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH of today's force to roughly the levels anticipated in the "Base Force" outlined by the Bush Administration, an increase in active-duty strength from 1.4 million to 1.6 million.

REPOSITION U.S. FORCES to respond to 21st century strategic realities by shifting Permanently based forces to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia, and by changing naval deployment patterns to reflect growing U.S. strategic concerns in East Asia.

MODERNIZE CURRENT U.S. FORCES SELECTIVELY, proceeding with the F-22 program while increasing purchases of lift, electronic support and other aircraft; expanding submarine and surface combatant fleets; purchasing Comanche helicopters and medium-weight ground vehicles for the Army, and the V-22 Osprey "tilt-rotor" aircraft for the Marine Corps.

CANCEL "ROADBLOCK" PROGRAMS such as the Joint Strike Fighter, CVX aircraft carrier, and Crusader howitzer system that would absorb exorbitant amounts of Pentagon funding while providing limited improvements to current capabilities. Savings from these canceled programs should be used to spur the process of military transformation.

DEVELOP AND DEPLOY GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSES to defend the American homeland and American allies, and to provide a secure basis for U.S. power projection around the world.

CONTROL THE NEW "INTERNATIONAL COMMONS" OF SPACE AND "CYBERSPACE," and pave the way for the creation of a new military service - U.S. Space Forces - with the mission of space control.

EXPLOIT THE "REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS" to insure the long-term superiority of U.S. conventional forces. Establish a two-stage transformation process which :

maximizes the value of current weapons systems through the application of advanced technologies, and,

produces more profound improvements in military capabilities, encourages competition between single services and joint-service experimentation efforts.

I

NCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING gradually to a minimum level of 3.5 to 3.8 percent of gross domestic product, adding $15 billion to $20 billion to total defense spending annually.

...

In sum, the 1990s have been a "decade of defense neglect."

...

Four Essential Missions :

HOMELAND DEFENSE.

America must defend its homeland. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was the key element in homeland defense; it remains essential. But the new century has brought with it new challenges. While reconfiguring its nuclear force, the United States also must counteract the effects of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction that may soon allow lesser states to deter U.S. military action by threatening U.S. allies and the American homeland itself. Of all the new and current missions for U.S. armed forces, this must have priority.

LARGE WARS.

Second, the United States must retain sufficient forces able to rapidly deploy and win multiple simultaneous large-scale wars and also to be able to respond to unanticipated contingencies in regions where it does not maintain forward-based forces.

This resembles the "two-war" standard that has been the basis of U.S. force planning over the past decade. Yet this standard needs to be updated to account for new realities and potential new conflicts.

CONSTABULARY DUTIES.

Third, the Pentagon must retain forces to preserve the current peace in ways that fall short of conduction major theater campaigns. A decade's experience and the policies of two administrations have shown that such forces must be expanded to meet the needs of the new, long-term NATO mission in the Balkans, the continuing no-fly-zone and other missions in Southwest Asia, and other presence missions in vital regions of East Asia. These duties are today's most frequent missions, requiring forces configured for combat but capable of long-term, independent constabulary operations.

TRANSFORM U.S. ARMED FORCES.

Finally, the Pentagon must begin now to exploit the so-called "revolution in military affairs," sparked by the introduction of advanced technologies into military systems; this must be regarded as a separate and critical mission worthy of a share of force structure and defense budgets.

Transformation Forces

The fourth element in American force posture - and certainly the one, which holds the key to any longer-term hopes to extend the current Pax Americana - is the mission to transform U.S. military forces to meet new geopolitical and technological challenges. While the prime directive for transformation will be to design and deploy global missile defense system, the effects of information and other advanced technologies promise to revolutionize the nature of conventional armed forces. Moreover, themed to create weapons systems optimized for operations in the Pacific theater will create requirements quite distinct from the current generation of systems designed for warfare on the European continent and those new systems like the F-22 fighter that also were developed to meet late-Cold-War needs.

Although the basic concept for a system of global missile defenses capable of defending the United States and its allies against the threat of smaller and simpler ballistic missiles has been well understood since the late 1980s, a decade has been squandered in developing the requisite technologies. In fact, work on the key elements of such a system, especially those that would operate in space, has either been so slowed or halted completely, so that the process of deploying robust missile defenses remains a long-term project. If for no other reason, the mission to create such a missile defense system should be considered a matter of military transformation.


As will be argued more fully below, effective ballistic missile defenses will be the central element in the exercise of American power and the projection of U.S. military forces abroad. Without it, weak states operating small arsenals of crude ballistic missiles, armed with basic nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction, will be a in a strong position to deter the United States from using conventional force, no matter the technological or other advantages we may enjoy. Even if such enemies are merely able to threaten American allies rather than the United States homeland itself, America's ability to project power will be deeply compromised. Alas, neither Administration strategists nor Pentagon force planners seem to have grasped this elemental point; certainly, efforts to fund, design and develop an effective system of missile defenses do not reflect any sense of urgency. Nonetheless, the first task in transforming U.S. military to meet the technological and strategic realities of a new century is to create such a system. Creating a system of global missile defenses is but the first task of transformation; the need to reshape U.S. conventional forces is almost as pressing. For, although American armed forces possess capabilities and enjoy advantages that far surpass those of even our richest and closest allies, let alone our declared and potential enemies, the combination of technological and strategic change that marks the new century places these advantages at risk. Today's U.S. conventional forces are masters of a mature paradigm of warfare, marked by the dominance of armored vehicles, aircraft carriers and, especially, manned tactical aircraft, that is beginning to be overtaken by a new paradigm, marked by long-range precision strikes and the proliferation of missile technologies. Ironically, it has been the United States that has pioneered this new form of high-technology conventional warfare: it was suggested by the 1991 Gulf War and has been revealed more fully by the operations of the past decade. Even the "Allied Force" air war for Kosovo showed a distorted version of the emerging paradigm of warfare.

Yet even these pioneering capabilities are the residue of investments first made in the mid- and late 1980s; over the past decade the pace of innovation within the Pentagon has slowed measurably. In part, this is due to reduced defense budgets, the overwhelming dominance of U.S. forces today, and the multiplicity of constabulary missions. And without the driving challenge of the Soviet military threat, efforts at innovation have lacked urgency. Nonetheless, a variety of new potential challenges can be clearly foreseen. The Chinese military, in particular, seeks to exploit the revolution in military affairs to offset American advantages in naval and air power, for example. If the United States is to retain the technological and tactical advantages it now enjoys in large-scale conventional conflicts, the effort at transformation must be considered as pressing a mission as preparing for today's potential theater wars or constabulary missions - indeed, it must receive a significant, separate allocation of forces and budgetary resources over the next two decades.

In addition, the process of transformation must proceed from an appreciation of American strategy and political goals. For example, as the leader of a global network of alliances and strategic partnerships, U.S. armed forces cannot retreat into a "Fortress America." Thus, while long-range precision strikes will certainly play an increasingly large role in U.S. military operations, American forces must remain deployed abroad, in large numbers. To remain as the leader of a variety of coalitions, the United States must partake in the risks its allies face; security guarantees that depend solely upon power projected from the continental United States will inevitably become discounted. Moreover, the process of transformation should proceed in a spirit of competition among the services and between service and joint approaches. Inevitably, new technologies may create the need for entirely new military organizations; this report will argue below that the emergence of space as a key theater of war suggests forcefully that, in time, it may be wise to create a separate "space service." Thus far, the Defense Department has attempted to take a prematurely joint approach to transformation. While it is certain that new technologies will allow for the closer combination of traditional service capabilities, it is too early in the process of transformation to choke off what should be the healthy and competitive face of "interservice rivalry." Because the separate services are the military institutions most attuned to providing forces designed to carry out the specific missions required by U.S. strategy, they are in fact best equipped to become the engines of transformation and change within the context of enduring mission requirements.

Finally, it must be remembered that the process of transformation is indeed a process: even the most vivid view of the armed forces of the future must be grounded in an understanding of today's forces. In general terms, it seems likely that the process of transformation will take several decades and that U.S. forces will continue to operate many, if not most, of today's weapons systems for a decade or more. Thus, it can be foreseen that the process of transformation will in fact be a two-stage process: first of transition, then of more thoroughgoing transformation. The break point will come when a preponderance of new weapons systems begins to enter service, perhaps when, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles begin to be as numerous as manned aircraft. In this regard, the Pentagon should be very wary of making large investments in new programs - tanks, planes, aircraft carriers, for example - that would commit U.S. forces to current paradigms of warfare for many decades to come.

...

Persian Gulf

In the decade since the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf and the surrounding region has witnessed a geometric increase in the presence of U.S. armed forces, peaking above 500,000 troops during Operation Desert Storm, but rarely falling below 20,000 in the intervening years. In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other neighboring states roughly 5,000 airmen and a large and varied fleet of Air Force aircraft patrol the skies of Operation Southern Watch, often complemented by Navy aircraft from carriers in the Gulf and, during the strikes reacting to Saddam Hussein's periodic provocations, cruise missiles from Navy surface vessels and submarines. Flights from Turkey under Northern Watch also involve substantial forces, and indeed more often result in combat actions.

After eight years of no-fly-zone operations, there is little reason to anticipate that the U.S. air presence in the region should diminish significantly as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. Although Saudi domestic sensibilities demand that the forces based in the Kingdom nominally remain rotational forces, it has become apparent that this is now a semi-permanent mission. From an American perspective, the value of such bases would endure even should Saddam pass from the scene. Over the long term, Iran may well prove as large a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf as Iraq has. And even should U.S.-Iranian relations improve, retaining forward-based forces in the region would still be an essential element in U.S. security strategy given the longstanding American interests in the region. In addition to the aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone, the United States now also retains what amounts to a near-permanent land force presence in Kuwait. A substantial heavy task force with almost the strength of a brigade rotates four times a year on average for maneuvers and joint training with the Kuwaiti army, with the result that commanders now believe that, in conjunction with the Southern Watch fleet, Kuwait itself is strongly defended against any Iraqi attack. With a minor increase in strength, more permanent basing arrangements, and continued no fly and "no drive" zone enforcement, the danger of a repeat short-warning Iraqi invasion as in 1990 would be significantly reduced. With the rationalization of ground-based U.S. air forces in the region, the demand for carrier presence in the region can be relaxed.

As recent strikes against Iraq demonstrate, the preferred weapon for punitive raids is the cruise missile, supplemented by stealthy strike aircraft and longer-range Air Force strike aircraft. Carrier aircraft are most useful in sustaining a campaign begun with missiles and stealth strike aircraft, indicating that a surface action group capable of launching several hundred cruise missiles is the most valuable naval presence in the Gulf. With a substantial permanent Army ground presence in Kuwait, the demands for Marine presence in the Gulf could be scaled back as well.

...

To preserve American military preeminence in the coming decades, the Department of Defense must move more aggressively to experiment with new technologies and operational concepts, and seek to exploit the emerging revolution in military affairs. Information technologies, in particular, are becoming more prevalent and significant components of modern military systems. These information technologies are having the same kind of transforming effects on military affairs as they are having in the larger world. The effects of this military transformation will have profound implications for how wars are fought, what kinds of weapons will dominate the battlefield and, inevitably, which nations enjoy military preeminence. The United States enjoys every prospect of leading this transformation. Indeed, it was the improvements in capabilities acquired during the American defense buildup of the 1980s that hinted at and then confirmed, during Operation Desert Storm, that a revolution in military affairs was at hand. At the same time, the process of military transformation will present opportunities for America's adversaries to develop new capabilities that in turn will create new challenges for U.S. military preeminence.

Moreover, the Pentagon, constrained by limited budgets and pressing current missions, has seen funding for experimentation and transformation crowded out in recent years. Spending on military research and development has been reduced dramatically over the past decade. Indeed, during the mid-1980's, when the Defense Department was in the midst of the Reagan buildup which was primarily an effort to expand existing forces and field traditional weapons systems, research spending represented 20 percent of total Pentagon budgets. By contrast, today's research and development accounts total only 8 percent of defense spending. And even this reduced total is primarily for upgrades of current weapons. Without increased spending on basic research and development the United States will be unable to exploit the RMA and preserve its technological edge on future battlefields.

Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. The United States cannot simply declare a "strategic pause" while experimenting with new technologies and operational concepts. Nor can it choose to pursue a transformation strategy that would decouple American and allied interests. A transformation strategy that solely pursued capabilities for projecting force from the United States, for example, and sacrificed forward basing and presence, would be at odds with larger American policy goals and would trouble American allies.

Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor. Domestic politics and industrial policy will shape the pace and content of transformation as much as the requirements of current missions. A decision to suspend or terminate aircraft carrier production, as recommended by this report and as justified by the clear direction of military technology, will cause great upheaval. Likewise, systems entering production today - the F-22 fighter, for example - will be in service inventories for decades to come. Wise management of this process will consist in large measure of figuring out the right moments to halt production of current-paradigm weapons and shift to radically new designs. The expense associated with some programs can make them roadblocks to the larger process of transformation - the Joint Strike Fighter program, at a total of approximately $200 billion, seems an unwise investment. Thus, this report advocates a two-stage process of change - transition and transformation - over the coming decades.

In general, to maintain American military preeminence that is consistent with the requirements of a strategy of American global leadership, tomorrow's U.S. armed forces must meet three new missions :

Global missile defenses.

A network against limited strikes, capable of protecting the United States, its allies and forward-deployed forces, must be constructed. This must be a layered system of land, sea, air and space based components.

Control of space and cyberspace.

Much as control of the high seas - and the protection of international commerce - defined global powers in the past, so will control of the new "international commons" be a key to world power in the future. An America incapable of protecting its interests or that of its allies in space or the "info sphere" will find it difficult to exert global political leadership.

Pursuing a two-stage strategy for of transforming conventional forces.

In exploiting the "revolution in military affairs," the Pentagon must be driven by the enduring missions for U.S. forces. This process will have two stages: transition, featuring a mix of current and new systems; and true transformation, featuring new systems, organizations and operational concepts. This process must take a competitive approach, with services and joint-service operations competing for new roles and missions. Any successful process of transformation must be linked to the services, which are the institutions within the Defense Department with the ability and the responsibility for linking budgets and resources to specific missions.

Missile Defenses

Ever since the Persian Gulf War of 1991, when an Iraqi Scud missile hit a Saudi warehouse in which American soldiers were sleeping, causing the largest single number of casualties in the war; when Israeli and Saudi citizens donned gas masks in nightly terror of Scud attacks; and when the great "Scud Hunt" proved to be an elusive game that absorbed a huge proportion of U.S. aircraft, the value of the ballistic missile has been clear to America's adversaries. When their missiles are tipped with warheads carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, even weak regional powers have a credible deterrent, regardless of the balance of conventional forces. That is why, according to the CIA, a number of regimes deeply hostile to America - North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria - "already have or are developing ballistic missiles" that could threaten U.S allies and forces abroad. And one, North Korea, is on the verge of deploying missiles that can hit the American homeland. Such capabilities pose a grave challenge to the American peace and the military power that preserves that peace.

The ability to control this emerging threat through traditional nonproliferation treaties is limited when the geopolitical and strategic advantages of such weapons are so apparent and so readily acquired. The Clinton Administration's diplomacy, threats and pleadings did nothing to prevent first India and shortly thereafter Pakistan from demonstrating their nuclear capabilities. Nor have formal international agreements such as the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime done much to stem missile proliferation, even when backed by U.S. sanctions; in the final analysis, the administration has preferred to subordinate its nonproliferation policy to larger regional and country-specific goals. Thus, President Clinton lamented in June 1998 that he found sanctions legislation so inflexible that he was forced to "fudge" the intelligence evidence on China's transfer of ballistic missiles to Pakistan to avoid the legal requirements to impose sanctions on Beijing.

At the same time, the administration's devotion to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union has frustrated development of useful ballistic missile defenses. This is reflected in deep budget cuts - planned spending on missile defenses for the late 1990s has been more than halved, halting work on space-based interceptors, cutting funds for a national missile defense system by 80 percent and theater defenses by 30 percent. Further, the administration has cut funding just at the crucial moments when individual programs begin to show promise. Only upgrades of currently existing systems like the Patriot missile - originally designed primarily for air defense against jet fighters, not missile defense - have proceeded generally on course.

Most damaging of all was the decision in 1993 to terminate the "Brilliant Pebbles" project. This legacy of the original Reagan era "Star Wars" effort had matured to the point where it was becoming feasible to develop a space-based interceptor capable of destroying ballistic missiles in the early or middle portion of their flight - far preferable than attempting to hit individual warheads surrounded by clusters of decoys on their final course toward their targets. But since a space-based system would violate the ABM Treaty, the administration killed the "Brilliant Pebbles" program, choosing instead to proceed with a ground-based interceptor and radar system - one that will be costly without being especially effective.

While there is an argument to be made for "terminal" ground-based interceptors as an element in a larger architecture of missile defenses, it deserves the lowest rather than the first priority. The first element in any missile defense network should be a galaxy of surveillance satellites with sensors capable of acquiring enemy ballistic missiles immediately upon launch. Once a missile is tracked and targeted, this information needs to be instantly disseminated through a world-wide command-and-control system, including direct links to interceptors. To address the special problems of theater range ballistic missiles, theater-level defenses should be layered as well. In addition to space-based systems, these theater systems should include both land and sea-based interceptors, to allow for deployment to trouble spots to reinforce theater systems already in place or to cover gaps where no defenses exist. In addition, they should be "two-tiered," providing close-in "point defense" of valuable targets and forces as well as upper-level, "theater wide" coverage.

Current programs could provide the necessary density for a layered approach to theater missile defense, although funding for each component has been inadequate, especially for the upper-tier, sea based effort, known as the Navy Theater-Wide program. Point defense is to be provided by the Patriot Advanced Capability, Level 3, or PAC-3 version of the Patriot air defense missile and by the Navy Area Defense system, likewise an upgrade of the current Standard air defense missile and the Aegis radar system. Both systems are on the verge of being deployed.

These lower-tier defenses, though they will be capable of providing protection against the basic Scuds and Scud variants that comprise the arsenals of most American adversaries today, are less effective against longer-range, higher-velocity missiles that several states have under development. Moreover, they will be less effective against missiles with more complex warheads or those that break apart, as many Iraqi modified Scuds did during the Gulf War. And finally, point defenses, even when they successfully intercept an incoming missile, may not offset the effects against weapons of mass destruction.

Thus the requirement for upper-tier, theater-wide defenses like the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Navy Theater-Wide systems. Though housed in a Patriot-like launcher, THAAD is an entirely new system designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles earlier in their flight, in the so-called "mid-course." The Navy Theater- Wide system is based upon the Aegis system, with an upgraded radar and higher velocity - though intentionally slowed down to meet administration concerns over violating the ABM Treaty - version of the Standard missile. The THAAD system has enjoyed recent test success, but development of the Navy Theater-Wide system has been hampered by lack of funds.

Similarly, a fifth component of a theater-wide network of ballistic missile defenses, the Air Force's airborne laser project, has suffered from insufficient funding. This system, which mounts a high energy laser in a 747 aircraft, is designed to intercept theater ballistic missiles in their earliest, or "boost" phase, when they are most vulnerable. To maximize their effectiveness, these theater-level interceptors should receive continuous targeting information directly from a global constellation of satellites carrying infrared sensors capable of detecting ballistic missile launches as they happen.

The low-earth-orbit tier of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS Low), now under development by the Air Force, will provide continuous observations of ballistic missiles in the boost, midcourse and reentry phases of attack. Current missile tracking radars can see objects only above the horizon and must be placed in friendly territory; consequently, they are most effective only in the later phases of a ballistic missile's flight. SBIRS Low, however, can see a hostile missile earlier in its trajectory, increasing times for interception and multiplying the effectiveness of theater-range interceptors by cueing their radars with targeting data. It will also provide precise launch-point information, allowing theater forces a better chance to destroy hostile launchers before more missiles can be fired.

There is also a SBIRS High project, but both SBIRS programs have suffered budget cuts that are to delay their deployments by two years. But to be most effective, this array global reconnaissance and targeting satellites should be linked to a global network of space-based interceptors (or space-based lasers). In fact, it is misleading to think of such a system as a "national" missile defense system, for it would be a vital element in theater defenses, protecting U.S. allies or expeditionary forces abroad from longer-range theater weapons. This is why the Bush Administration's missile defense architecture, which is almost identical to the network described above, was called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).

By contrast, the Clinton Administration's plan to develop limited national missile defenses based upon Minuteman III missiles fitted with a so-called "exoatmospheric kill vehicle" is the most technologically challenging, most expensive, and least effective form of long range ballistic missile defense. Indeed, the Clinton Administration's differentiation between theater and national missile defense systems is yet another legacy of the ABM Treaty, one that does not fit the current strategic circumstances. Moreover, by differentiating between national and theater defenses, current plans drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, and risk "decoupling." Conversely, American interests will diverge from those of our allies if theater defenses can protect our friends and forces abroad, but the American people at home remain threatened.

In the post-Cold War era, America and its allies, rather than the Soviet Union, have become the primary objects of deterrence and it is states like Iraq, Iran and North Korea who most wish to develop deterrent capabilities. Projecting conventional military forces or simply asserting political influence abroad, particularly in times of crisis, will be far more complex and constrained when the American homeland or the territory of our allies is subject to attack by otherwise weak rogue regimes capable of cobbling together a miniscule ballistic missile force. Building an effective, robust, layered, global system of missile defenses is a prerequisite for maintaining American preeminence.


Space and Cyberspace

No system of missile defenses can be fully effective without placing sensors and weapons in space. Although this would appear to be creating a potential new theater of warfare, in fact space has been militarized for the better part of four decades. Weather, communications, navigation and reconnaissance satellites are increasingly essential elements in American military power. Indeed, U.S. armed forces are uniquely dependent upon space. As the 1996 Joint Strategy Review, a precursor to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, concluded, "Space is already inextricably linked to military operations on land, on the sea, and in the air." The report of the National Defense Panel agreed: "Unrestricted use of space has become a major strategic interest of the United States."

Given the advantages U.S. armed forces enjoy as a result of this unrestricted use of space, it is shortsighted to expect potential adversaries to refrain from attempting to offset to disable or offset U.S. space capabilities. And with the proliferation of space know-how and related technology around the world, our adversaries will inevitably seek to enjoy many of the same space advantages in the future. Moreover, "space commerce" is a growing part of the global economy. In 1996, commercial launches exceeded military launches in the United States, and commercial revenues exceeded government expenditures on space. Today, more than 1,100 commercial companies across more than 50 countries are developing, building, and operating space systems.

Many of these commercial space systems have direct military applications, including information from global positioning system constellations and better than- one-meter resolution imaging satellites. Indeed, 95 percent of current U.S. military communications are carried over commercial circuits, including commercial communications satellites.

The U.S. Space Command foresees that in the coming decades, an adversary will have sophisticated regional situational awareness. Enemies may very well know, in near real time, the disposition of all forces....In fact, national military forces, paramilitary units, terrorists, and any other potential adversaries will share the high ground of space with the United States and its allies. Adversaries may also share the same commercial satellite services for communications, imagery, and navigation....The space "playing field" is leveling rapidly, so U.S. forces will be increasingly vulnerable. Though adversaries will benefit greatly from space, losing the use of space may be more devastating to the United States. It would be intolerable for U.S. forces...to be deprived of capabilities in space.

In short, the unequivocal supremacy in space enjoyed by the United States today will be increasingly at risk. As Colin Gray and John Sheldon have written, "Space control is not an avoidable issue. It is not an optional extra." For U.S. armed forces to continue to assert military preeminence, control of space - defined by Space Command as "the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space" - must be an essential element of our military strategy. If America cannot maintain that control, its ability to conduct global military operations will be severely complicated, far more costly, and potentially fatally compromised.

The complexity of space control will only grow as commercial activity increases. American and other allied investments in space systems will create a requirement to secure and protect these space assets; they are already an important measure of American power. Yet it will not merely be enough to protect friendly commercial uses of space. As Space Command also recognizes, the United States must also have the capability to deny America's adversaries the use of commercial space platforms for military purposes in times of crises and conflicts. Indeed, space is likely to become the new "international commons," where commercial and security interests are intertwined and related. Just as Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote about "sea-power" at the beginning of the 20th century in this sense, American strategists will be forced to regard "space-power" in the 21st.


To ensure America's control of space in the near term, the minimum requirements are to develop a robust capability to transport systems to space, carry on operations once there, and service and recover space systems as needed. As outlined by Space Command, carrying out this program would include a mix of reusable and expendable launch vehicles and vehicles that can operate within space, including "space tugs to deploy, reconstitute, replenish, refurbish, augment, and sustain" space systems. But, over the longer term, maintaining control of space will inevitably require the application of force both in space and from space, including but not limited to antimissile defenses and defensive systems capable of protecting U.S. and allied satellites; space control cannot be sustained in any other fashion, with conventional land, sea, or air force, or by electronic warfare. This eventuality is already recognized by official U.S. national space policy, which states that the "Department of Defense shall maintain a capability to execute the mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space control and force application." (Emphasis added.)

In sum, the ability to preserve American military preeminence in the future will rest in increasing measure on the ability to operate in space militarily; both the requirements for effective global missile defenses and projecting global conventional military power demand it. Unfortunately, neither the Clinton Administration nor past U.S. defense reviews have established a coherent policy and program for achieving this goal.


Ends and Means of Space Control

As with defense spending more broadly, the state of U.S. "space forces" - the systems required to ensure continued access and eventual control of space - has deteriorated over the past decade, and few new initiatives or programs are on the immediate horizon. The U.S. approach to space has been one of dilatory drift. As Gen. Richard Myers, commander-in-chief of SPACECOM, put it, "Our Cold War-era capabilities have atrophied," even though those capabilities are still important today. And while Space Command has a clear vision of what must be done in space, it speaks equally clearly about "the question of resources." As the command succinctly notes its long-range plan: "When we match the reality of space dependence against resource trends, we find a problem."

But in addition to the problem of lack of resources, there is an institutional problem. Indeed, some of the difficulties in maintaining U.S. military space supremacy result from the bureaucratic "black hole" that prevents the SPACECOM vision from gaining the support required to carry it out. For one, U.S. military space planning remains linked to the ups and downs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. America's difficulties in reducing the cost of space launches - perhaps the single biggest hurdle to improving U.S. space capabilities overall - result in part from the requirements and dominance of NASA programs over the past several decades, most notably the space shuttle program.

Secondly, within the national security bureaucracy, the majority of space investment decisions are made by the National Reconnaissance Office and the Air Force, neither of which considers military operations outside the earth's atmosphere as a primary mission. And there is no question that in an era of tightened budgets, investments in space-control capabilities have suffered for lack of institutional support and have been squeezed out by these organization's other priorities. Although, under the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the mid-1980s, the unified commanders - of which SPACECOM is one - have a greater say in Pentagon programming and budgeting, these powers remain secondary to the traditional "raise and- train" powers of the separate services.

Therefore, over the long haul, it will be necessary to unite the essential elements of the current SPACECOM vision to the resource-allocation and institution-building responsibilities of a military service. In addition, it is almost certain that the conduct of warfare in outer space will differ as much from traditional air warfare as air warfare has from warfare at sea or on land; space warfare will demand new organizations, operational strategies, doctrines and training schemes. Thus, the argument to replace U.S. Space Command with U.S. Space Forces - a separate service under the Defense Department - is compelling. While it is conceivable that, as military space capabilities develop, a transitory "Space Corps" under the Department of the Air Force might make sense, it ought to be regarded as an intermediary step, analogous to the World War II-era Army Air Corps, not to the Marine Corps, which remains a part of the Navy Department. If space control is an essential element for maintaining American military preeminence in the decades to come, then it will be imperative to reorganize the Department of Defense to ensure that its institutional structure reflects new military realities.


Cyberspace, or 'Net-War'

If outer space represents an emerging medium of warfare, then "cyberspace," and in particular the Internet hold similar promise and threat. And as with space, access to and use of cyberspace and the Internet are emerging elements in global commerce, politics and power. Any nation wishing to assert itself globally must take account of this other new "global commons."

The Internet is also playing an increasingly important role in warfare and human political conflict. From the early use of the Internet by Zapatista insurgents in Mexico to the war in Kosovo, communication by computer has added a new dimension to warfare. Moreover, the use of the Internet to spread computer viruses reveals how easy it can be to disrupt the normal functioning of commercial and even military computer networks. Any nation which cannot assure the free and secure access of its citizens to these systems will sacrifice an element of its sovereignty and its power.

Although many concepts of "cyber-war" have elements of science fiction about them, and the role of the Defense Department in establishing "control," or even what "security" on the Internet means, requires a consideration of a host of legal, moral and political issues, there nonetheless will remain an imperative to be able to deny America and its allies' enemies the ability to disrupt or paralyze either the military's or the commercial sector's computer networks. Conversely, an offensive capability could offer America's military and political leaders an invaluable tool in disabling an adversary in a decisive manner.

Taken together, the prospects for space war or "cyberspace war" represent the truly revolutionary potential inherent in the notion of military transformation. These future forms of warfare are technologically immature, to be sure. But, it is also clear that for the U.S. armed forces to remain preeminent and avoid an Achilles Heel in the exercise of its power they must be sure that these potential future forms of warfare favor America just as today's air, land and sea warfare reflect United States military dominance.


CONCLUSION

In its simplest terms, our intent is to provide forces sufficient to meet today's missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, while readying U.S. armed forces for the likely new missions of the future. Thus, the defense program described above would preserve current force structure while improving its readiness, better posturing it for its current missions, and making selected investments in modernization.

At the same time, we would shift the weight of defense recapitalization efforts to transforming U.S. forces for the decades to come. At four cents on the dollar of America's national wealth, this is an affordable program. It is also a wise program. Only such a force posture, service structure and level of defense spending will provide America and its leaders with a variety of forces to meet the strategic demands of the world's sole superpower.

Keeping the American peace requires the U.S. military to undertake a broad array of missions today and rise to very different challenges tomorrow, but there can be no retreat from these missions without compromising American leadership and the benevolent order it secures. This is the choice we face. It is not a choice between preeminence today and preeminence tomorrow. Global leadership is not something exercised at our leisure, when the mood strikes us or when our core national security interests are directly threatened; then it is already too late. Rather, it is a choice whether or not to maintain American military preeminence, to secure American geopolitical leadership, and to preserve the American peace.